Nous présentons ici une introduction à la lecture des Deux sources de la morale et de la religion d'Henri Bergson, publié en 1932. Cet ouvrage est le moins fréquenté des livres de Bergson : on le ramène à quelques formules sur l'opposition du " clos " et de " l'ouvert ", et à un mysticisme un peu fumeux. Pourtant, Bergson a mis vingt-cinq ans à se documenter pour écrire ce livre qui constitue une synthèse philosophique des travaux de la sociologie, (...) de l'anthropologie et de la psychologie des religions de son temps. Surtout, on voit s'y articuler les trois dimensions qui travaillent toute la pensée métaphysique de Bergson : le vital, le mental et le social ; et on comprend mieux que l'affirmation du point de vue de la conscience individuelle ne nie en aucune façon son inscription dans la vie biologique et dans une société politique. L'existence de grands individus y est mise au service de l'action de toute l'humanité et de la vie elle-même. F. Keck propose une présentation générale de l'ouvrage à travers son contexte intellectuel et sa méthode dualiste. A. Bouaniche commente cinq textes extraits des Deux sources ou d'ouvrages qui l'éclairent. F. Worms présente une interprétation de ce livre à la lumière du rapport entre la vie et la morale chez Bergson et dans la philosophie contemporaine. (shrink)

Introduction by the Rev. R. J. Fletcher -- The memory of Francis Bacon. A speech delivered in Gray's Inn hall at the tercentenary celebration by Mr. H. E. Duke -- List of benchers and guests present at the tercentenary celebration, 1908 -- Francis Bacon. A speech delivered by the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P., on the occasion of the unveiling of the Bacon statue at Gray's Inn [27th June 1912] -- Francis Bacon's essays: Of gardens and Of (...) masques and triumphs, reprinted from the earliest editions. (shrink)

John F. Henry is an eminent economist who has made important contributions to heterodox economics drawing on Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen, and John Maynard Keynes. His historical approach offers radical insights into the evolution of ideas (ideologies and theories) giving rise to and/or induced by the changes in capitalist society. Essays collected in this festschrift not only evaluate John Henry's contributions in connection to Marx's and Veblen's theories, but also apply them to the socio-economic issues in (...) the 21st century. In Part I leading heterodox economists in the traditions of Marxism, Post Keynesianism, and Institutionalism critically examine Marx's and Veblen's theoretical frameworks (and their connections to each other) that have become the foundations of heterodox economics. Chapters in Part II showcase alternative theoretical explanations inspired by Marx, Veblen, and Henry. Topics in this Part include financial crisis, financialization, capital accumulation, economics teaching, and the historical relationship between money and class society. Part III is devoted to John Henry's heterodox economics encapsulated in his "farewell" lecture, interview, and bibliography. Essays in this book, individually and collectively, make an important point that the history of economic thought (or historical analysis of economic theory and policy) is an integral part of developing heterodox economics as an alternative theoretical framework. Anyone who is troubled by the recurring failure of capitalism as well as mainstream economics will find this book well worth reading. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Michel Henry has renewed our understanding of life as immanent affectivity: life cannot be reduced to what can be made visible; it is – as immanent and as affectivity – radically invisible. However, if life (la vie) is radically immanent, the living (le vivant ) has nonetheless to relate to the world: it has to exist . But, since existence requires and includes intentional components, human reality – being both living and existing – implies that immanence and intentionality be (...) related to one another, even though they are conceived at the same time as radically distinct modes of appearing in Henry’s phenomenology of life. Following this line of thought, we are faced with at least two questions: First, what reality does immanent appearing have for us as existing and intentional beings? And second, from an ethical point of view, what does Henry’s opposition of “barbarism” and “second birth” mean in terms of existence? As will be shown, it follows from the standpoint of radical phenomenology itself that immanent affectivity has reality for us only insofar as it finds its expression or translation in the realm of the intentionally visible and that, with regard to ethics, both “barbarism” and its overcoming in “second birth” are effective only insofar as they are mediated through representations. Henry’s critique of representation and intentionality needs therefore to be revised, especially in the field of practical philosophy, where the essential role played by intentionality has to be acknowledged even by radical phenomenology. (shrink)

Does Michel Henry’s Phenomenology of life include an ethical and political dimension? It appears that the writings about Marx already include such aspects, especially in reference to the problem of social determinism. More generally, however, our attention must be focused on what Henry calls the transcendental genesis of politics which accounts for the lack of autonomy of the political field, just like in the case of economics. Politics may then be analyzed against that background, for instance in the (...) writings on totalitarianism and democracy. The frame given by transcendental genesis is also tied to the fundamental opposition between barbarism and culture which pervades the axiological implications of Henry’s work. Because culture is always referring to a “culture of life,” it allows connecting life and its immanent reality with ethical/political questions. (shrink)

“We accept the original theoretical path opened by Michel Henry, which consists in considering the body from the point of view of the flesh and, hence, of life. But, precisely, the question is to know what is the meaning of life that is attested through the phenomenon of the flesh.”1 Such is Renaud Barbaras’s starting point in La vie lacunaire, one of his most recent contributions to a phenomenology of life and to the debate with Michel Henry’s concept (...) of life as immanent auto-affection.2 The support given to Henry’s pioneering path, however, seems to contrast with the prospect of developing a phenomenology of life radically opposed to that of Henry, a prospect mentioned already in Desire and Distance and... (shrink)

Radical phenomenology is nonintentional phenomenology, and it opposes what Michel Henry has designated since The Essence of Manifestation "onto-phenomenological monism,"1 according to which appearing is always ecstatic, that is, transcendent. Contrary to monism, radical phenomenology maintains a dualism of appearing: underlying the intentionally given, life reveals itself in pure immanence. Nonetheless, this living self-affection can never appear to intentionality, although the second is grounded in the first: they are two modes of appearing that are essentially different. While the very (...) essence of appearing or manifestation lies in immanent self-affection, intentional appearing is derived from and second to .. (shrink)

The twentieth century Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky was one of the earliest and most important proponents—but also critics—of Bergson’s philosophy in Russia at a time when many Russian philosophers were preoccupied with the same complex of philosophical questions and answers that Bergson was addressing. Thus, if only from the standpoint of intellectual history, Lossky is central to the study of the reception of Bergson in Russia. In this article, I present the principal historical links, points of agreement between Bergson and (...) Lossky, such as their respective anti-Kantianism, intuitivism, ontological realism, vitalism, organicism, Neo-Platonism, as well as their points of disagreement, including some of Lossky’s key criticisms of Bergson, with special emphasis on the issues of intuition, ideal being, substance and change, time, and sensible qualities. This paper is meant as an introduction to the translations of Lossky’s “Heдocтaтки гнoceoлoгiи Бepгcoнa и влiянie иxъ нa eгo мeтaфизикy” (The Defects of Bergson’s Epistemology and Their Consequences on His Metaphysics) (1913) and his review of Bergson’s, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932), which are published in the present issue of Studies in East European Thought. (shrink)

Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life or radical phenomenology understands life as immanent and transcendental affectivity. From this point of view, ethics can be characterized as the ethics of affectivity, the central stake of which lies in the recognition of life. However, the question is to what extent a philosophical discourse can be held on a reality that, being immanent, is principally inaccessible for intentionality and how such discourse is in fact possible. As radical phenomenology relies on certainty opposed to (...) evidence, it can be shown that both the possibility and the practical effectiveness of its discourse are ultimately rooted in life’s self-revelation. Henry’s works may then be understood as mediation towards the recognition of life, especially through the concepts of quasi-performativity and translation. (shrink)

Comment une phénoménologie de la vie doit-elle penser le monde? La phénoménologie de Michel Henry se constitue dans et par la thèse de l’acosmisme de la vie : la vie doit se penser comme hors monde et, du point de vue phénoménologique, elle représente un mode d’apparaître spécifique qui doit être distingué de l’apparaître ek-statique. Le rapport correspondant semble donc être avant tout un rapport d’exclusion parce que l’apparaître propre à la vie n’est pas dépendant de l’apparaître du monde...

Cet article a pour but de mettre en regard l’analyse de l’esprit de Hume avec les critiques de l’associationnisme qu’on faites William James et Henri Bergson à la fin du XIXe siècle, lorsqu’ils proposèrent de renverser l’ordre des genèses psychologiques : non pas association d’éléments atomiques séparés (les impressions et idées), mais dissociation de touts vagues confus (les expériences pures). Il cherche à montrer sur l’exemple de la perception de la ressemblance que Hume est sauf du reproche d’avoir ainsi « (...) atomisé » la vie mentale, ce que montre notamment la fonction sélective et donc discriminante du principe de ressemblance. Le commentaire de Deleuze qui voit dans le dualisme de l’atomisme et de l’associationnisme chez Hume le critère même de définition de l’empirisme en général s’en trouve de ce fait contesté. (shrink)

If the phenomenological movement is irreducibly tied to Husserl’s groundbreaking lifework, it has, like all philosophical currents, outer boundaries. At one end of the spectrum, Fichte’s Berlin lectures in 1804 represent not only the most accomplished and systematic version of his theory of knowing, or Wissenschaftslehre; they also contain what Fichte himself designated as Phänomenologie or as theory of appearing, Erscheinungslehre. At the other end, as one of the most prominent and challenging outcomes of contemporary phenomenology, we find Henry’s (...) radical phenomenology, a phenomenology of life continuously developed from 1963 to 2002, from the Essence of Manifestation to Incarnation and Words of Christ.1 But .. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Both Fichte's 1804 Wissenschaftslehre and Henry's radical phenomenology conceive of the absolute as life. At the same time, both have to deal with a contradiction that seems to follow inevitably from the limitations they impose on thought and intentionality: Since the latter are intrinsically incapable of apprehending life as absolute and immanent, how is radical phenomenology, and how is the Wissenschaftslehre, even possible? The article takes this difficulty as the start to a possible comparison between Fichte and (...) class='Hi'>Henry. But, as will be seen, Henry's claim about the existence of a nonintentional mode of appearing is not shared by Fichte. (shrink)

This is a translation from the Russian of Nikolai Lossky’s review of Henri Bergson, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932). The review was published in the Parisian émigré journal Новый Град (Cité nouvelle) in 1932. In this review, Lossky criticizes Bergson for leaving some key problems of the philosophy of religion unresolved, namely that of God’s relation to the world (theism vs. pantheism), that of immortality, as well as that of evil. He also criticizes Bergson’s (...) “extreme biologism” in his explanation of morality, which, in his view, subjectivizes the objects of religion. For Lossky, the symbolic images of the Christian religion are not subjective “fabulations,” but real symbols through which God reveals himself to us. Likewise, according to Lossky, true morality cannot be explained in terms of biological adaptation, but must rely on the foundation of an objective, i.e., Platonic, axiological sphere. (Frédéric Tremblay). (shrink)

L’article met à jour un désaccord très peu connu entre les PP. Gaston Fessard (1897-1978) et Henri de Lubac (1896-1991), à propos du discernement à poser sur le communisme et le progressisme chrétien entre 1945 et 1950. Après avoir dégagé les deux périodes qui marquent l’histoire de ce différend – publication de France, prends garde de perdre ta liberté (1945-1946) aux éditions du Témoignage chrétien (I) ; conférence du P. de Lubac sur « La conception de l’homme » aux Semaines (...) Sociales de juillet 1947 (II) – l’auteur analyse les raisons du désaccord, en pointant notamment le fait que le P. Fessard avait développé une véritable méthode de discernement des événements et des idéologies, là où le P. de Lubac ne disposait pas d’instrument équivalent (III). (shrink)

This is a translation from the Russian of Nikolai Lossky’s “Heдocтaтки гнoceoлoгiи Бepгcoнa и влiянie иxъ нa eгo мeтaфизикy” (The Defects of Bergson’s Epistemology and Their Consequences on His Metaphysics), which was published in the journal Boпpocы филocoфiи и пcиxoлoгiи (Questions of Philosophy and Psychology) in 1913. In this article, Lossky criticizes Bergson’s epistemological dualism, which completely separates intuition from reason, and which rejects reason in favor of intuition. For Bergson, reality is continuous, indivisible, fluid, etc., and reason distorts it (...) through its acts of division, abstraction, extraction, and so on. Lossky argues that this conclusion does not follow. Reason does not distort the living flow of reality; it rather provides a window unto aspects of the otherwise undivided seamless flowing organic whole. In fact, reason is itself a species of intuition in its own right, namely an intellectual intuition, the object of which is the atemporal facet of the world (the Platonic ideal realm), which is necessary for the existence of its temporal facet. Lossky thus challenges Bergson’s one-sided and self-defeating reduction of being to a flux of changes devoid of changing things. (Frédéric Tremblay). (shrink)

Leibniz' Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der amerikanischen Philosophie ist bisher wenig erforscht worden. In diesem Aufsatz untersuche ich den Beitrag zweier amerikanischer Idealisten der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts zur Leibniz-Forschung. Der erstere, Frederic Henry Hedge, ein enger Mitarbeiter Emersons und eine zentrale Figur der transcendentalist movement, legte die erste Übersetzung der Monadologie ins Englische vor und schrieb die erste wichtige wissenschaftliche Abhandlung über Leibniz in einer amerikanischen Zeitschrift. Der zweite, H. A. P. Torrey, von prägendem Einfluß auf die (...) Gedanken John Deweys, schrieb eine Reihe kritischer Essays zur Théodicée, die Auswirkungen auf Deweys Buch über Leibniz hatten. In diesem Aufsatz gebe ich eine Überblick der Arbeiten von Hedge und Torrey, bewerte ihre Arbeiten zu Leibniz und untersuche einige Aspekte ihres Einflusses auf das amerikanische Denken. Ich folgere, daß Leibniz' Einfluß auf die amerikanische Philosophie größer ist als allgemein angenommen und schlage weitere Forschungsmöglichkeiten vor. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Zhuangzi: A New Translation of the Sayings of Master Zhuang as Interpreted by Guo Xiang by Richard John LynnZiqiang Zhao (bio)Zhuangzi: A New Translation of the Sayings of Master Zhuang as Interpreted by Guo Xiang. By Richard John Lynn. New York: Columbia University Press, 2022. Pp. ixxxix + 712. Hardcover $140.00, isbn 978-0-231-12386-0. The Zhuangzi occupies an important place in the history of Chinese literature, philosophy, and religion. (...) English translations of the Zhuangzi have roughly a 140-year history. There have been twelve full English translations, from the first full translation by Frederic Henry Balfour (1846-1909), published in 1881, to the translation by Richard John Lynn considered here. Within this framework, Lynn's translation of the Zhuangzi undoubtedly represents great progress in the English translations of the Zhuangzi and Zhuangzi studies. Based on Guo Xiang's 郭象 (252–312) commentaries, Lynn's is a new type of translation, aptly titled Zhuangzi: a New Translation of the Sayings of Master Zhuang as Interpreted by Guo Xiang (hereafter New Translation). Lynn's New Translation consists of seven main sections, namely, a "Translator's Note," "Introduction," the main body of the translation–the thirty-three Chapters of the Zhuangzi further divided into "The Sayings of Master Zhuang: The Inner Chapters," "The Sayings of Master Zhuang: The Outer Chapters, and "The Sayings of Master Zhuang: The Miscellaneous Chapters"-- four Appendices, two Glossaries, Bibliography, and an Index. In the "Translator's Note," Lynn explains the arrangement and format of the translation, the preliminary research work, the translation techniques, and the selection of Guo Xiang's commentaries as the base text. The translator devotes nearly ninety pages to the introduction of the translation. In this section, Lynn explains what distinguishes his translation from previous translations. He then introduces the specific content of the introductory section, which consists of twenty parts. This section attempts to explain the social context in which the basic assumptions and intentions of Guo Xiang's thoughts were established, the reasons for the formation of Guo Xiang's commentary and Guo Xiang's rise to power that provided an opportunity to "be in the position of recorder for the senior tutor to carry out the duties of 'capital commandant' as his deputy" (p. xxvii). This begins with trying to sort out the controversy over Guo Xiang's annotations and attempts to resolve it. Next, there are attempts to define the basic features of Guo Xiang's thought, locate them in the context of a particular era, and analyze them from the perspective of contemporary [End Page 1] philosophy. Finally, there is an exploration of the relationship between the Zhuangzi and Guo Xiang's commentary, as well as Guo Xiang's relation to Buddhism. Lynn also examines the history and recension of the Zhuangzi, and briefly introduces the basic features of the Zhuangzi. This part of the introduction consistently discusses Guo Xiang's commentary on the Zhuangzi through a logical and clear exposition. It offers readers an opportunity to understand Guo Xiang's commentary in a way which makes it easier for them to follow the rationale behind the translation. The next section is the main body of the translation of the Zhuangzi and Guo Xiang's commentary. Lynn translates the Inner, Outer, and Miscellaneous chapters of the Zhuangzi following Guo Xiang's distinctive reading. The titles are all in pinyin, and are explained in English translation in brackets, except for Chapter 21, Chapter 23, Chapter 25, and Chapter 32. The translation itself adopts the same form as Guo Xiang's annotated text. The text from the Zhuangzi is in bold and above the corresponding commentary. Importantly, the Zhuangzi itself is translated according to Guo Xiang's commentary, and not the other way around. Lynn also explains or introduces some proper nouns, names of people etc., by adding notes. These notes not only reflect the ideas contained in the Zhuangzi in a more detailed and concrete way, but also facilitate the reader's understanding of its connotations. In the process of translation, translators adopt strategies, and Lynn is no exception. Specifically, for the translation of each chapter title, Lynn adopted both "domestication" and "foreignization" strategies (Baker... (shrink)

The scientific study of consciousness in the late 19th century, which took place in Western countries across disciplines such as neurology, physiology, neuropathology, psychology, psychiatry and philosophy, appears to have striking parallels to current crossdisciplinary developments in the neurosciences. The 19th century period, however, has received little scholarly attention from historians of medicine, psychology, or science. Historians of depth psychology have investigated the area as part of the history of psychiatry, but cleaved most closely to the versions presented by early (...) psychoanalysts- turned-historians, who have consistently portrayed Freud as the only legitimate history of the period, thus marking the territory of the late 19th century as inherently Freudo-centric. More recently a new line of historiography emanating from the work of the late Henri Ellenberger has launched a post-Freudian perspective in which the classical depth psychologies of Freud, Jung, and Adler may now be understood in a wider and deeper historical context defined by the development of a so-called French, Swiss, English, and American psychotherapeutic axis between 1881 and 1918, before the advent of psychoanalysis. Chief among the prime movers of this axis was Frederic William Henry Myers, graduate of Cambridge University, and co-founder of the Society for Psychical Research in England in 1882. Myers' grasp of the literature of the day regarding the scientific study of consciousness was both profound, and highly influential, particularly on such figures as William James. Since the period itself has yet to be fully reconstructed, the identity of Myers and his contribution to the scientific study of consciousness remain obscure, but are also receiving new attention in the area of modern consciousness studies. (shrink)

Qu’advient-il quand, à la pointe extrême du continent eurasien, la méditation de l’un des plus grands penseurs français franchit les océans pour être accueillie, critiquée sans concession aussi bien que reprise ? Faut-il s’attendre au récit d’un malentendu quand Henri Bergson se trouve relu par son contemporain Nishida Kitarô, né deux années après que son pays se soit ouvert à l’Occident ? Ce dernier va-t-il, depuis le Japon, risquer avec la pensée française ce que firent jadis les européens Leibniz et (...) Malebranche avec la chinoise, ou Schopenhauer avec l’indienne ? Y a-t-il là pure appropriation, et selon quelles spécificités notionnelles et méthodologiques ? Cette rencontre ne laisse-t-elle pas présager, au contraire, un échange véritable quoique encore fragile qui, s’il emprunte presque tout son vocabulaire et ses concepts à l’Europe, en tire un esprit subtil et nouveau ? Les trois études rassemblées dans cet ouvrage se proposent d’envisager ce débat, né il y a près d’un siècle de nous, et la contribution qu’il pourrait apporter à une réflexion sur l’idée de philosophie comparée. (shrink)

The article aims to show the value of taking ecclesiology – the theology of the church – into account in the study of British imperial ideology by describing how Anglican intra-ecclesiological debates shaped mid-nineteenth-century discourse about the British Empire. It highlights the impact of the Oxford Movement on the mind of the British colonial administrator Sir Frederic Rogers, Lord Blachford (1811-1889), by revealing the connections between his imperial thought and concepts arising from Tractarian ecclesiology. In particular, it argues that (...) Rogers’ understanding of British colonial development builds on Tractarian ideas of balance and consistency. By retaining a sense of the importance of the historic connection with the colonies of settlement while respecting their right to be free, Rogers constituted the imperial relationship as a _ via media. _. (shrink)